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Abstract
This paper builds up an extension to the Mussa and Rosen (1978) model of quality pricing
under perfect competition. Our model incorporates decreasing returns to scale. First, we
predict that exchange rate shocks are imperfectly passed through into prices. Second, prices of
low quality goods are more sensitive to exchange rate shocks than prices of high quality goods.
Third, in response to an exchange rate appreciation, the composition of exports shifts towards
higher quality and more expensive goods. We test those predictions using highly disaggregated
price and quantity US import data. We  nd that the prices of high quality goods, proxied
as high unit price goods, are more sensitive to exchange rate movements. Moreover, we  nd
evidence that in response to an exchange rate appreciation, the composition of exports shifts
towards high unit price goods.
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1This paper builds up an extension to the Mussa and Rosen (1978) model of quality pricing
under perfect competition. Our model incorporates decreasing returns to scale. First, we predict
that real exchange rate shocks are imperfectly passed through into prices. Second, prices of low
quality goods are more sensitive to exchange rate shocks than prices of high quality goods. Third,
in response to an exchange rate appreciation, the composition of exports shifts towards higher
quality and more expensive goods. We test those predictions using highly disaggregated price
and quantity US import data. We  nd that the prices of high quality goods, proxied as high unit
price goods, are more sensitive to exchange rate movements. Moreover, we  nd evidence that in
response to an exchange rate appreciation, the composition of exports shifts towards high unit
price goods.
This paper develops a model of international trade under perfect competition and  exible
prices that accounts for the slow and incomplete pass through of exchange rate  uctuations into
consumer prices. We build an extension of the Mussa and Rosen (1978) model of quality pricing.
Exporters sell goods of di erent quality to consumers with heterogeneous preferences for quality.
In equilibrium, higher quality goods are more expensive. We derive three testable predictions.
First, exchange rate  uctuations are only partially passed through to consumers. Second, there is
more pass through in the long run than in the short run, and more pass through for aggregate prices
than for individual prices. Third, there is more pass through for low quality goods than for high
quality goods. When the exchange rate of an exporting country appreciates, existing exporters
scale down their production, hence driving prices up. At the same time, when exporters scale
down their production their marginal cost of production decreases, and the short run equilibrium
thus display positive, yet impartial pass through. In the long run, low quality exporters pull out,
driving prices up even further. Since those goods are inexpensive, aggregate prices go up more
than individual prices. This exit of low quality exporters has a larger impact on the price of low
quality goods than on the price of high quality goods. Low quality goods prices adjust more than
high quality goods prices.
We augment a competitive version of the Mussa and Rosen (1978) model with a distribution
sector. In our framework, exporters pay a  xed market access cost to build a local distribution
network. Some inputs to distribution are  xed in the short run, leading to decreasing returns
to scale at the local level, and thus pricing to market. We analyze why cost pass through is
incomplete and quality dependent. First, exchange rate  uctuations are only partially passed
2through to consumers because the response of each  rm’s output and the number of exporters
counteract cost changes. Second, when the cost of production increases, the composition of
exporters shifts towards more expensive goods. Thus, aggregate prices overstate good speci c
pass through. Third, low quality goods react stronger to cost changes than high quality goods.
We test these predictions using highly disaggregated price and quantity US import data. We
 nd that the prices of high quality goods, proxied as high unit price goods, are more sensitive
to exchange rate movements. Moreover, we  nd evidence that in response to an exchange rate
appreciation, the composition of exports shifts towards high unit price goods.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Why are movements of relative costs brought about by exchange rate  uctuations passed through
to consumers partially and only gradually? We introduce quality pricing and decreasing returns
to scale in a model of international trade under perfect competition and  exible prices. Our model
generates three testable predictions. First, exchange rate  uctuations are only partially passed
through to consumers. Second, there is more pass through for low quality goods than for high
quality goods. Third, in response to an exchange rate appreciation, exports shift towards higher
quality prices.
We consider a purely real model of international price setting. Exchange rate shocks are
assumed to be real productivity shocks, so that there is no price stickiness, hence no money
illusion, and no role for monetary policy. We develop an extension of the Mussa and Rosen (1978)
model of quality pricing. We depart from their model in two important dimensions. First, we
consider a perfectly competitive setting, as opposed to the original monopoly setting. Second, we
introduce decreasing returns to scale at the  rm level. This allows for a feedback of exchange rate
shocks into both prices and quantities, which is at the heart of our model. Firms o er goods of
di erent qualities. These goods are matched with consumers with heterogeneous preferences for
quality. In equilibrium, higher quality goods are matched with higher valuation consumers. The
price schedule for goods with di erent qualities depends on the consumers that buy those goods.
Prices are higher when the valuations of consumers in the market are higher. We derive three
predictions for the pass through of exchange rate shocks, where we de ne exchange rate shocks
as real productivity shocks.
First, exchange rate shocks are only partially passed through to consumers. When an exporting
3country is hit by a real negative exchange rate shock, say an appreciation of its exchange rate vis
à vis its trading partners, exporting  rms scale down their exports. The relative scarcity of goods
forces the lowest valuation consumers out of the market. As a consequence, exporters are matched
with higher valuation consumers, which drives the export prices up. Part of the exchange rate
shock is passed through to consumers.
Second, we predict that there is more pass through for low quality goods than for high quality
goods. This prediction relies on a subtle argument. After a negative exchange rate shock, there are
two forces driving all prices up. First, the exit of low quality  rms shrinks the total supply of goods,
forces the lowest valuation consumers out of the market. The average valuation of the remaining
consumers increases, and all prices increase. Second, all  rms scale down their production, which
also shrinks the total supply of goods and pushes all prices up. The relative strength of this second
e ect is larger for higher quality goods. For the lowest quality goods actually exported, the  rst
e ect is the main source of price increase. The lowest quality exporting  rm exactly breaks even,
so that its price is exactly equal to its cost. Following an appreciation of the exchange rate,
which amounts to a negative productivity shock for exporters, low quality  rms exit until the last
 rm exactly breaks even. So for the lowest quality goods, prices move almost one for one with
the exchange rate.1 The price of higher quality goods on the other hand depends on the overall
tightness of the market, which determines which consumer they are matched with. In the limit,
in nitely high quality goods prices are, in relative terms, not at all a ected by the exit of low
quality  rms. Their price increases only because all  rms scale down their production. The pass
through of exchange rate shocks is higher for low quality goods than for high quality goods.
Third, we predict that in response to an exchange rate appreciation, the composition of exports
shifts towards high quality-high price goods. This predictions is due to the endogenous selection
of exporters, and to the composition e ect of goods with di erent prices. In the presence of
 xed entry cost into foreign markets, only the highest quality  rms are able to export. When
hit by a negative exchange rate shock, the lowest quality  rms pull out of the export market.
These  rms happen to be those  rms that charge the lowest price. The exit of low quality low
price exporters has two e ects, on individual prices, and on aggregate prices. First, the exit of
low quality exporters shrinks the total supply of goods, driving out low valuation consumers.
1Note that the price of the lowest quality good actually exported moves exactly one for one with the exchange
rate. However, because some  rms exit, the lowest quality good is no longer the same after an exchange rate
appreciation. The good that becomes the lowest quality good exported after the exchange rate appreciation was
strictly above the lowest quality before the exchange rate shock. Therefore, its price increases less than one for one
with the exchange rate. To simplify, this is the basic intuition for the incomplete pass through of exchange rate.
4The remaining  rms are matched with higher valuation consumers, so that each individual price
increases further. Second, since only the low quality low price exporters pull out, the composition
of exports shifts towards high price goods.
Campa and Goldberg (2006) give an up to date review of the evidence on incomplete pass
through. Even though there is almost full pass through of exchange rate shocks for prices at the
dock, there is much more limited pass through for consumer prices. The order or magnitude is
40% in the short run to 60% in the long run. The empirical literature has stressed the importance
of distribution margins in explaining this fact. Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2003), Burstein,
Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2005), and Campa and Goldberg (2006) argue that non tradable inputs
such as distribution costs play a key role. Burstein et al. (2003) note that for a typical consumption
good in the US, distribution margins account for more than 40% of the  nal price. Finally, and
most related to our model, Campa and Goldberg (2006) note that distribution margins do not
remain stable during real exchange rate  uctuations. A 1% real exchange rate depreciation leads
to a .47% reduction in distribution margins. This response of local distribution margins to the
exchange rate has also been documented for the case of the beer industry by Hellerstein (2005).
To capture these facts, we introduce a two tiered production function similar to Bacchetta and
van Wincoop (2003). Exporters must not only ship goods, but also assemble and distribute them
locally. We assume that the distribution capacity is  xed, so that supply to any foreign market
is subject to decreasing returns to scale. This gives rise to incomplete pass through of exchange
rate shocks, despite full pass through at the dock, and to  uctuations in the distribution margin
in response to exchange rate movements. One important point is that in our model, distribution
costs are paid in exporters’ currency, not in local currency. We make this assumption to stress
the fact that distribution costs matter, even if no part of this cost is paid in importer currency.
If part of the distribution costs were paid in local currency, our results would be reinforced.
We point out the potential importance of composition e ects in estimating exchange rate
pass through. Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2005) suggest one speci c composition e ect,
 ight from quality. They point out that following a large devaluation, consumers stop buying
high quality goods. Our predictions regarding this  ight from quality are ambiguous. Indeed,
following a devaluation, we predict that overall, since fewer quality goods are imported, many
consumers switch from quality goods to generic goods. However, the consumers that still buy
quality di erentiated goods will typically buy higher quality goods, at a higher price. Note
5that we do not consider the impact of exchange rate  uctuations on disposable income, so that
consumers in our model are never prevented from buying quality goods because of their budget
constraint. This is an important limitation of our model, but it makes the analysis much simpler.
We believe that this model describes normal exchange rate movements well enough, but may miss
what happens during very large  uctuations such as large devaluations.
There is only scarce evidence of the relative pass through of exchange rate shocks for goods of
di erent quality. Gagnon and Knetter (1995) study the exchange rate pass through for car exports
from three main automobiles exporters. This remains however an understudied area. Despite a
growing literature on measuring the quality of exports, there is to our knowledge little evidence
on the degree of exchange rate pass through for exports of di erent quality.
In addition to examining the quality dimension of cost pass-through, we also highlight that
incomplete pass-through can arise under perfect competition and  exible prices. The existing
theoretical literature on exchange rate pass through and pricing to market has so far relied on
two alternative assumptions: either price stickiness, or imperfect competition.
For example, Betts and Devreux (1996), Taylor (2001), or Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003)
show why pass through is incomplete and staggered when prices are sticky. Undoubtedly, sticky
prices matter for limited pass through. Gopinath and Rigobon (2007) document that even though
exchange rates  uctuate daily, prices at the dock adjust only rarely. However, the set of  rms
that adjust prices in a given period passes through exchange rate changes only with a rate of less
than a fourth. While menu costs2 can explain why actual prices are changed infrequently, they
can not directly explain why the optimal price responds very little when costs change. Our paper
rationalizes the latter aspect.
Our paper is related to the second strand of literature arguing that response of the optimal
price to the exchange rate is low. The seminal papers of Krugman (1987) and Dornbusch (1987)
have been followed by more elaborate models, such as Yang (1997), Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc
(2005) or Atkeson and Burstein (2006). These models rely on the fact that when  rms adjust their
prices, they move along the demand curve and face a di erent demand elasticity. Under some
conditions on the shape of the demand curve, exporters will adjust their markups and dampen
price  uctuations, leading to pricing to market and incomplete pass through of exchange rate
2Kleshchelski and Vincent (2007) argue that  rms and customers form long-term relationships because con-
sumers incur costs to switch sellers. Therefore,  rms may decide to keep prices perfectly stable also in the absence
of menu costs.
6shocks.
We depart from this assumption by assuming perfect competition, and our framework is thus
more applicable in industries with a large set of competitors. In the abovementioned literature,
as the number of  rms competing in a sector increases, the pricing to market predictions quickly
become negligible. Moving directly to a competitive setting provides more robust predictions.
An alternative branch of the literature such as Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), Gust, Leduc and
Vifgusson (2006) and Chen, Imbs and Scott (2006) directly assumes that prices are complement in
the utility function. We propose another explanation where the matching of  rms and consumers
generates this complementarity in equilibrium.
Finally, our model delivers predictions for the composition e ect of prices that are in stark
contrast with the existing trade literature with heterogeneity in productivity. In models with
heterogeneous  rms following to Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz (2003), the most productive  rms
charge the lowest price. When hit by a negative productivity shock, the low productivity high
price  rms exit. In our model, the highest quality goods are sold at the highest price, and the
composition e ect of endogenous entry and exit goes in the opposite direction.3
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the general set up
of our model of quality pricing. In section 3, we analyze a speci c example and provide closed form
solutions. In section 4, we derive the predictions of our model for exchange rate pass through.
Section 5 presents empirical evidence in support of our theoretical model. Section 6 concludes.
2M o d e l
In this section, we develop a model of quality pricing and international trade.
There are two countries, home and foreign. The two countries are respectively populated by a
mass  and  of consumers that share the same preferences. There are two sectors, A and .
The A sector produces a homogeneous good, which may be freely traded. We will only consider
equilibria where all consumers in each country consume some of this numeraire good. We can
therefore normalize the price of this good to unity in each country. The  sector produces a
continuum of goods that di er in terms of quality. For simplicity, we assume that  goods are
di erentiated by country of origin.
3It should be noted that once endogenous entry of new  rms into the domestic market is allowed, as in Ghironi
and Melitz (2005), a positive productivity shock may lead to an appreciation of the terms of trade. Since we do
not consider the endogenous entry into the domestic market, we cannot directly compare our predictions to those.
7There is a continuum of competitive  rms producing each type of good. Firms in the  sector
are heterogeneous in terms of the quality of the good they produce. They face an decreasing
returns to scale technology due to the presence of  xed a  xed distribution capacity. In addition,
in order to enter the foreign market, they must pay a  xed entry cost. There is a continuum of
(heterogeneous) consumers buying those goods. The consumers are price taker.
The timing is the following. First,  rms receive their quality draw. Second, they decide
whether or not to enter each market, home and foreign. Third, given the prices that they expect,
they decide how much output to produce. Finally, prices are determined so as to clear all markets.
The strategies of  rms and consumers are the following. Firms maximize expected pro ts, given
their expectation for prices. Consumers maximize their utility, given the set of goods available
and the prices they observe.
Preferences
Consumers can consume a continuum of A goods. For the consumption of  goods, we consider
a discrete choice model. Consumers can consume either zero or one unit of domestic  good, and
either zero or one unit of foreign  good. Di erent  goods have di erent quality, and di erent
consumers have di erent valuation for quality. A consumer with valuation  for quality, who
consumes one unit of home good with quality  and one unit of foreign good with quality ,
and  units of the homogenous good, derives a utility,
 ( )=( + )+ (1)
For simplicity, if a consumer does not consume one of the  goods, we set its quality to zero.
Valuations for quality, , are distributed over all consumers according to,
   	 () (2)
where 	 is the cumulative distribution of the ’s, and 
 () the density. Valuations are distributed
over the interval [¯ max].4 We assume that there is a strictly positive density over the entire
domain: 
 ()  0 for    [¯ max]. We also assume that the distribution of income is such that
consumers can always a ord to buy one unit of  good.5
4We allow for 
max =+ . In our closed form example in section 3, we consider unbounded from above supports
for the distribution of valuation draws.
5Implicitly, we assume that high valuation consumers also have a high income, so that they can a ord the high
price for the  good they will buy in equilibrium.
8The main property of these preferences is that valuation and quality are complementary: the
higher a consumer’s valuation, the more she values quality, and the more she will be willing
to pay for quality. This property allows us to derive two important results. First, there is
assortative matching between consumers and goods, that is higher valuation consumers will buy
higher quality goods. Second, the pace at which prices increase with quality is exactly determined
by the valuation of consumers. We state and prove formally these two results in the following two
propositions.
Proposition 1 (assortative matching) If an equilibrium exists, consumers’ valuations and
goods’ quality are matched assortatively:
1  2   1   2
where consumer  =1 2 with valuation  i sm a t c h e dw i t hag o o do fq u a l i t y.
Proof. See appendix A, page 9.
Given the complementarity between quality and valuation built into the preferences, assorta-
tive matching is a very intuitive result. High valuation consumer gain bene t more from quality.
It would not be optimal to allocate high quality goods to low valuation consumers, and hence any
market equilibrium must allocate higher quality goods to higher valuation consumers.
A direct corollary of this assortative matching is that, locally, relative prices are pinned down
by a no arbitrage condition on the consumer side. Higher quality goods are more expensive.
Moreover, prices increase with quality exactly according to the valuation of the consumers. The
following proposition states this result formally.
Proposition 2 If an equilibrium exists, the mapping from goods quality to prices is continuously




where () is the valuation of the consumer matched with a good of quality , 
() is the price of
this good, and 
0 () is the derivative of this price schedule.
Proof. See appendix A, page 26.
9It is straightforward to see from the previous two propositions that prices are increasing and
convex in quality. This property of prices is reminiscent of the Mussa and Rosen (1978) model
of quality pricing. Whether goods are supplied by a monopolist, as in Mussa and Rosen (1978),
by oligopolists as in Champsaur and Rochet (1989), or by atomistic price taking  rms as in this
model, prices must increase at an accelerating pace in order to prevent high valuation consumers
from buying low quality goods.
In the next section, we describe the production technology, and the behavior of  rms.
Production
Production in the A sector is made under constant returns to scale. The labor productivity at
home (abroad) is  (). We will only consider equilibria in which both countries produce the
A good. Labor can freely move between sectors. So the wage  () of domestic (foreign)
workers, in units of the A numeraire good, is simply equal to  ().
Goods’ quality: In the  sector, there is a continuum of mass  () of  rms in the
home (foreign) country. Each of these  rms produces a good of a speci c quality. Firms randomly
draw a quality shock from a stochastic distribution given by,
   	 () (3)
where 	 is the cumulative distribution of the ’s, and 
 the density. Qualities are distributed
over the interval [¯ max].6
Technology: Despite their di erences in quality, all  rms face the same technology for pro-
ducing  goods. They are subject to decreasing returns to scale. The cost for supplying  units
of  g o o d si sg i v e nb y (),w i t h (·) increasing and convex. We denote the marginal cost
of supplying the  unit of good by ()=0 (), 0 ()  0. For simplicity, we assume
that  rms produce goods for the domestic market independently from goods for the export mar-
ket. The cost function applies to each type of production separately. This allows us to study
sequentially the domestic production decision and the foreign production decision. The rationale
for this assumption is that upon entering a market, a  rm acquires a  xed distribution capacity.
Trade barriers: In order to export abroad, domestic  rms must overcome both a variable
cost for shipping each unit of good abroad, and a  xed cost of entering the foreign market. Those
costs are symmetric. The variable cost takes the traditional form of iceberg transportation costs,
6As for valuations, we allow for unbounded supports for the distributino of quality shocks.
10with fraction (   1) of all shipments melting on the way (1). The  xed cost of entry is equal
to 
	, which is paid in units of the A numeraire good.
We now consider the decision of a domestic  rm that decides to export abroad. Leaving
aside for the moment the question of whether or not it is pro table to pay the  xed entry cost,
we characterize the quantity an exporter would supply abroad. Firms are price taker, so they
decide to increase their supply of goods until their marginal cost equals the price of their good.
In equilibrium, a  rm that expects a price 
 for its good supplies  (
) units abroad, with  (
)
de ned by, ( (
)) = 









where  1 is the inverse of the cost function. Note that the marginal cost of selling the  unit
of good abroad is the marginal cost of production multiplied by . To sell one unit abroad, a
 rm must export  units, each at a cost (). The marginal cost is strictly increasing in the
quantity supplied, so that the quantity supplied  is strictly increasing in the price 
. All  rms
follow the same strategy and supply a quantity which depends of the price they expect to receive
for their quality.
Entry decision: Firms must decide whether or not to pay the  xed entry cost into the
foreign market. They compare the pro ts they would earn from exporting to the  xed entry cost.
Only those  rms whose gross pro ts are above the entry cost export. There is minimum price

min below which it is not pro table to export. The minimum price is given by the following zero







()   
	 =0 (5)
It states that the net pro t from exporting if the price abroad is 
min is exactly zero. Since (·)
and  (·) are strictly increasing, 
min is uniquely determined by Eq. (5).
Note that for the moment, we know the price of the lowest quality exported, but we still have
not determined the actual level of the lowest quality exported. It is determined in equilibrium,
which we de ne in the next section.
Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of a price schedule such that the goods market clears if consumers opti-
mally chose which good to consume, if any, and if  rms optimally chose how much to produce and
11whether or not to enter the foreign market. We will construct the equilibrium in the following
way. First, we match goods to consumers. Given this matching, we de ne the price schedule
matching quality to price, up to a constant. We then identify the quality of the good matched
with the lowest valuation consumer.
First, note that there are potentially three possible types of equilibrium: a sellers’ market
where there are more consumers than goods, a buyers’ market where there are more goods than
consumers, or a third case where neither all exporting  rms sell their good, nor all consumers buy
a  good. We will consider the case of a sellers market, where all exporting  rms sell their goods,
but not all consumers buy a  good.
We can rewrite the matching implied by proposition 1 and de ne formally the matching












for any    [min max],w h e r emin is the lowest quality exported, and  (
()) is the quantity
of good supplied by a  rm with quality . The left hand side is the number of goods with quality
 and above, whereas the right hand side is the number of consumers with valuation () and
a b o v e .F o ra n yl e v e lo fq u a l i t y, these two must be equal.
Given the matching between goods and consumers, we can derive prices from proposition 6.
Integrating prices over quality, we get the price the price 







for any    [min max],w h e r e() is the valuation of the consumer matched with quality 
g i v e ni nE q . ( 6 ) ,a n d
min is the price of the lowest quality exported, given by the zero cuto 
pro t condition (5).
We now have to determine the quality of the good matched with the lowest valuation consumer.
Since we are in a sellers’ market, some consumers will not buy any  goods. The last consumer
must be indi erent between buying and not buying good min,o ri no t h e rw o r d s ,s h em u s tb e




where (min) is the valuation of the consumer matched with quality min g i v e ni nE q .( 6 ) ,a n d

min is the price of the lowest quality exported, given by the zero cuto  pro t condition (5).
12An equilibrium price schedule will be solution to the zero cuto  pro t condition (5), the
matching equation (6), the pricing equation (7), and to equation (8) de ning the lowest quality
exported. The following proposition states the existence of such an equilibrium.
Proposition 3 There exists a (
(·) (·)
 min min) solution to Eqs. (5), (6), (7) and (8),
not necessarily unique.
Proof. See appendix A, page 27.
In order to derive closed form solutions for the path of exchange rate pass through, we introduce
a speci c functional form for the distribution of valuation and quality draws. We present this
example in the next section.
3 A closed form example
In order to analyze the properties of exchange rate pass through in our model, we consider a
speci c example. We are able to derive closed form solutions for the equilibrium and for all
variable of interest in this case.
First, we assume that both valuation shocks and quality shocks are Pareto distributed. The













Next, we assume that the marginal cost function takes the following form,
()= + 1
 (10)
Implicitly, we assume a two tiered production function. In order to sell one unit of  good, a
 rm must  rst ship its good to the destination market, and then distribute those goods locally.
We assume that  rms have a  xed installed distribution capacity (that they acquired when they
paid the  xed cost of entry), and that distribution is subject to decreasing returns to scale.
The  rst term, , in the cost function in Eq. (10) corresponds to the cost of shipping one
additional unit of good abroad. The second term, , corresponds to the cost of assembly.
Because of decreasing returns, the cost of assembling one additional unit of good increases with
13the total quantity supplied, . This simple functional form for the marginal cost ensures that in
equilibrium, the supply elasticity will be constant and equal to  for all  rms.
Firms equalize their marginal cost to the price they face, so that we have the following ex-










We are now able to solve for the equilibrium price schedule, as the following proposition shows.






, then there exists a unique
equilibrium price schedule, lowest quality exported, and lowest price, de ned as,
 
   
















with  and 0 some constants7.
Proof. See appendix A, page 29.
Asymptotically, the elasticity of the price with respect to quality converges to
+
+  1.
The more elastic the supply of goods by each individual exporter, that is the larger ,t h el e s s
responsive are prices to changes in quality. If the technology of production is such that large
changes in the quantity supplied are needed to generate some change in the marginal cost of
production ( high), then  rms with a higher quality will supply much larger quantities than
 rms with a lower quality. Instead of the price adjusting to make demand for and supply of
quality meet, most of the adjustment will come through quantities. The price of higher quality
goods will not be very high.
The other two key parameters that determine how prices are responsive to changes in quality
are the measure of the fatness of the tails of the distributions of quality and valuation for quality,
 and . If the quality of  rms is more homogenous ( high), or if the valuation of consumers
is more heterogeneous ( small), prices will be more responsive to changes in quality. This is
entirely driven by the sensitivity of either supply or demand to changes in prices. If  rms are





















14distribution, higher qualities are very scarce. The price of those higher qualities will therefore be
high. By the same token, if the distribution of consumers’ valuations is very dispersed, there are
relatively many consumers that a high valuation for quality, and who are therefore willing to pay

















Figure 1: Equilibrium price-quality schedule.
The equilibrium price schedule is presented on Figure 1, which plots the log of quality versus
the log of price. ln is the cost of shipping one unit of good abroad, absent of any assembly
cost. Because of the existence of a  xed entry cost,  rms must sell more than one unit of good in
order to generate enough pro t to recover this entry cost. There is a minimum quality, min,t h a t
commands a minimum price 
min, and this minimum price is strictly above ln.B e l o wt h a t
price, no  rm is willing to export. So any  rm with a quality below min w i l ln o te x p o r ti t sg o o d
abroad. The equilibrium price schedule starts at 
min and is then increasing and convex, and it
converges asymptotically to a log linear relationship.
Now that we have characterized the equilibrium price schedule, we can describe the impact of
exchange rate shocks on prices.
154 Exchange rate pass through
In this section, we describe the impact of exchange rate shocks on prices. We  rst de ne exchange
rate shocks as shocks to real wages arising from productivity shocks. We then characterize the
response to those shocks on individual prices, on the composition of exporters, and on aggregate
prices.
We de ne a shock to the exchange rate of the home country as a shock to the domestic wage
in terms of the international numeraire A good. When the domestic productivity in the A sector
 increases, as long as some labor is employed in each sector, the domestic wages will have to
increase proportionally with productivity. For  rms in the  sector, this amounts to a negative
productivity shock:  rms must pay their workers a higher wage, in units of the numeraire. In this
section, we will therefore de ne an appreciation of the domestic exchange rate as an increase in
the real wage .
What is the response of export prices to such an exchange rate shock? There are two margins
that will adjust to such an exchange rate shock. First,  rms, facing a higher marginal cost, scale
down their production and export smaller quantities abroad. This is the intensive margin of
adjustment. Second, facing this higher cost, some low quality  rms stop exporting altogether.
This is the extensive margin of adjustment. Those two margins lead to an overall reduction of
the total quantity of  goods exported, so a relative scarcity of home  goods abroad. Low
valuation consumers are pushed out of the market and stop buying  goods altogether. Overall,
goods are matched with higher valuation consumers, so that prices increase. This is the source of
exchange rate pass through into prices in our model. As fewer goods are exported, prices increase.
Because some low quality  rms exit the export market, and because supply responds to changes
in marginal cost with some  nite elasticity, the pass through is incomplete.
The response of prices to an exchange rate shock is depicted on Figure 2, which plots the
log of quality versus the log of price for two levels of the exchange rate. The exchange rate
appreciates from  at date  =0 ,t o×   at date  =1 , with the constant    1.F o l l o w i n g
an appreciation of the exchange rate, the price of the lowest quality exported, 
min,i n c r e a s e s
proportionally with the exchange rate. However, the lowest quality  rms pull out of the export
market, so that the lowest quality exported, min, increases. This exit of  rms, as well as the
reduction in the quantities exported by all  rms, leads to an increase of the prices charged for
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Figure 2: Exchange rate pass through.
rate. Moreover, the price increase is lower for higher quality goods.
In the remaining of this section, we describe formally the response of individual prices to
exchange rate shocks, the composition e ect of exchange rate shocks, and the response of aggregate
prices.
Proposition 5 (exchange rate pass through) There is incomplete pass through of exchange
rate shocks into the price of individual goods. The lower the quality of a good, the higher the pass
through.
Proof. See appendix A, page 29.
When the exchange rate appreciates,  rms scale down their production, and some low quality
exporter exit the export market altogether. There are two forces that drive all prices up. First, the
lowest quality exported is now higher. The valuation of the consumer buying the lowest quality
good increases. Since this consumer is willing to pay a higher price for the  good she buys, the
price of the low quality goods increase. Second, the overall supply of  goods abroad shrinks, so
that goods are now matched with higher valuation consumers. The slope of the price schedule
17gets steeper, and all prices increase. Prices of goods at di erent level of quality are a ected by
these two forces in di erent ways. For very high quality goods, the exit of low quality  rms and
the e ect this has on prices is negligible. Only the second force, the overall tightening of the
market, matters. For low quality goods on the other hand, both the change in the lowest quality
exported, and the overall tightening of the supply matter. In relative terms, low quality goods
prices increase more than high quality goods prices. There is more pass through for low quality
goods.
In order to understand the composition e ect due the endogenous selection of  rms into the
export market, we have to characterize precisely the response of the extensive and intensive
margins of trade to exchange rate  uctuations. The following proposition describes how both the
lowest price and the lowest quality exported respond to exchange rate shocks.
Proposition 6 The price of the lowest quality exported moves one for one with the exchange
rate. The lowest quality exported increases less than proportionally with the exchange rate.
Proof. See appendix A, page 32.
As the exchange rate appreciates, both the price of the lowest quality exported, 
min,a n d
the actual lowest quality exported, min, increase. Mechanically, since the  xed entry cost is
paid in foreign labor, 
min goes up one for one with the exchange rate. Therefore, the lowest
minimum price at which any  rm is willing to export increases one for one with the exchange
rate. However, because of the increase in the marginal cost of production, some  rms exit the
export market altogether, so that the lowest quality exported increases. Therefore, even for the
lowest quality exporter, the price charged abroad increases less than one for one with the exchange
rate. After an appreciation of the exchange rate, the new lowest quality exporter has a quality
higher than that of the lowest quality exporter prior to the exchange rate shock. Since the price
strictly increases with the quality, the new lowest quality good exported experiences an increase
in its price that is less than proportional to the exchange rate shock. In addition, in response to
an exchange rate appreciation, the share of high quality exports compared to low quality exports
increases.
In this section, we have proved three main results. First, following a shock to the real exchange
rate, there is only incomplete pass through into prices for all goods. Second, the pass through
18of exchange rate shocks is higher for lower quality goods. Third, the composition e ect due to
the exit of low quality exporters, implies that in response to an exchange rate appreciation, the
composition of exports shifts towards high quality/high price goods. In the next section, we test
those predictions using highly disaggregated US import data on prices and quantities.
5 Empirical evidence
In this section, we test the main predictions of our theoretical model using highly disaggregated US
import data on prices and quantities. We  nd evidence in support of our theoretical model. First,
high quality exports, as proxied by high unit value exports, experience less exchange rate pass
through. Second, in response to an exchange rate appreciation, we  nd evidence of a composition
e ect such that the share of high price goods increases. We do not however  nd any signi cant
evidence that goods are more likely to exit in response to an exchange rate appreciation, nor that
the probability of exit decreases with unit values.
We use a panel of highly disaggregated annual price and quantity data for US imports, from
1991 to 2001. Goods are disaggregated at the 10-digit Harmonized System, and grouped into
3-digit sectors. We use nominal bilateral exchange rates with the US trading partners. The data
sources are described in Appendix B.
To test the predictions of the theoretical model, we measure the response of prices in the US of
goods imported from a given country to a shock of the bilateral nominal exchange rate of the US
vis à vis this country. We control for local demand shocks in the US by including the current US
GDP as a control. We also control for the marginal cost of production in the exporting country
as well as for the overall level of in ation in the exporting country. We will be interested in both
the response of prices of individual goods to exchange rate shocks, and the response of aggregate
prices to the same shocks.
5.1 Exchange rate pass-through and quality
In this section, we run exchange rate pass-through regressions for individual goods. We  nd  rst
that there is a large heterogeneity in the response of export prices of individual goods to exchange
rate shocks. This heterogeneity is partially explained by di erences in quality. Higher quality
goods, proxied by high unit value goods, tend to be less sensitive to exchange rate shocks than
low quality goods.
19We de ne a good (denoted ) as a 10 Harmonized System category. This is the highest level
of disaggregation available for most goods imported by the US. Following Campa and Goldberg
(2005), we adopt the following speci cation for estimating the degree of exchange rate pass-
through for each HS-10 good ,
 ln
 ()=()+  () ln!"#

 +$ () ln%





where the price 
 () is the unit value of good  imported form country  at time ,e x p r e s s e d
in US dollars, !"#

 is the real US GDP, %
 is a measure of labor cost in country , &
 is
the consumption price index in country ,a n d'
 is the bilateral exchange rate between country
 and the US, expressed as the price in US dollar of the foreign currency (so that an increase in
' corresponds to an appreciation of the foreign currency).
Table 1: Exchange rate pass-through.
DLog Unit Value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DLog Exch. Rate .26*** .36*** .35*** .35***
(25.03) (28.84) (27.09) (26.88)
DLog CPI .21*** .20*** .17***
(4.35) (4.18) (3.42)




Constant .01*** .00* .00* .02***
(6.67) (1.85) (1.88) (5.66)
Observations 814,460 776,172 738,432 738,432
Notes: This table explains the change in individual prices in response to exchange rate shocks. The
dependent variable is the log di erence in unit values. The explanatory variables are: the log change in
the bilateral exchange rate, the log change in the CPI of the exporting country, the log change in the US
GDP, the log change in the exporting country’s labor cost. , ,a n d means statistically di erent from
zero at 10, 5 and 1% level of signi cance. (absolute values of T-stats in parenthesis).
We  rst run this regression for all goods together (estimating a single ). As documented
in the literature, there is strong evidence of incomplete exchange rate shocks into import prices.
Table 1 shows the results of this regression. Depending on the set of controls included, pass-
through ranges between 26% and 36%. We then run this regression separately and estimate the
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Figure 3: Distribution of exchange rate pass-through across individual prices (the exchange rate
pass-through is estimated from Eq. (12); it measures the percentage change of export prices to a 1% appreciation
of the exporting country’s currency vis à vis the USD).
of individual prices to exchange rate shocks.
The most salient feature of the data is the very large degree of heterogeneity in the degree of
exchange rate pass-through across di erent goods. Figure 3 describes the distribution of exchange
rate pass-through across individual goods. The degree of exchange rate pass-through for di erent
goods is averaged out within 3-digit sectors for readability. For most sectors, the average exchange
rate pass-through is between 0 (no sensitivity of export prices to exchange rate movements) and
100% (full pass-through, export prices move one for one with the exchange rate). For a few goods,
exchange rate pass-through is above 100%, or even negative. Most goods are characterized by
incomplete pass-through of exchange rate shocks into export prices. The main feature of the data
is the large heterogeneity in the degree of exchange rate pass-through.
We  nd that part of the dispersion of exchange rate pass-through can be explained by di er-
ences in quality, as proxied by unit values. Table 2 describes the relationship between the degree
of exchange rate pass-through to our measure of quality. We  nd that higher quality goods have
a signi cantly lower degree of exchange rate pass-through. The di erence of exchange rate pass-
through across goods of di erent quality is economically signi cant. A 1% increase in quality
corresponds to a degree of exchange rate pass-through that is 3 percentage points lower. This
relation remains and becomes even stronger if the data are winsorized, so that it does not seem
to be driven by outliers.
21Table 2: Exchange rate pass-through and quality.
Pass-through by 3-digit Pass-through by 3-digit
(winsorized)
(1) (2)
Log of avg. unit value in 3-digit -.03*
(1.87)





Notes: This table explains the degree of exchange rate pass-through for di erent qualities. The dependent
variable is the averega exchange rate pass-through within a 3-digit sector. The explanatory variables is
the average unit value within the sector. Column (1) considers all the data, whereas data are winsorized
in column (2). , ,a n d means statistically di erent from zero at 10, 5 and 1% level of signi cance.
(absolute values of T-stats in parenthesis).
In the next section, we show that the composition of exports changes in response to exchange
rate shocks.
5.2 Measuring composition e ects
In this section, we test our main prediction that exchange rate  uctuations induce changes in the
composition of exports. We  nd evidence that in response to an appreciation of the exchange rate
of an exporting country, the composition of goods shifts towards higher quality goods both on the
extensive and on the intensive margin: the set of goods shifts towards higher quality goods, and
the share of high quality goods increases.
To test those predictions, we run the same exchange rate pass-through regressions as in the
previous section at the aggregate level, for di erent de nitions of changes in aggregate prices. We
de ne a sector, denoted by  , as the set of HS-10 categories in a given 3-digit sector (we perform
robustness checks at other levels of aggregation, 2, 4, 5 and 6-digit). The generic exchange rate
pass-through regression we run is the following,
 ln
 ( ) = ( )+  ( ) ln!"#
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 + ( ) ln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In order to isolate changes in the composition of exports in response to exchange rate shocks, we
22use three de nitions of aggregate prices ( ln
 ),
 
   
   
 ln
 ( ) = ln
P
  	 
 ()
 ()   ln
P
  	 1 
 1 ()
 1 ()( )
 ln
 ( ) = ln
P
  	 1  	 
 ()
 ()   ln
P
  	 1  	 
 1 ()
 1 ()( ))
 ln
 ( ) = ln
P
  	 
 1 ()
 ()   ln
P
  	 1 
 1 ()
 1 ()( )
where 
 () is the price in US dollars of good  imported from country  at time ,   is the set
of goods in sector   imported from country  at time , 
 () is the share of the good  in the
total imports of goods in sector   imported from country . The  rst de nition, (),a l l o w sb o t h
the set of goods exported ( ) and the trade shares, 
 (), to change from one year to the next.
Therefore, under de nition , both the extensive and the intensive margins of trade are allowed
to adjust. The second de nition, ()), keeps the set of goods constant. Under de nition ),o n l y
the intensive margin is allowed to adjust. Finally, the third de nition, (), keeps the trade shares
constant, so that only the extensive margin is allowed to adjust.
Table 3 presents the regression results for 3-digit sectors. It is evidence of the presence of a
Table 3: Measuring composition e ects.
DLog Price
()( ))( )
DLog Exch. Rate .327*** .246*** .139***
(6.05) (5.01) (2.93)
DLog CPI .340*** -.064 -.299**
(2.35) (.48) (2.33)
DLog GDP .0004 -.011*** .001
(.92) (3.13) (.34)
DLog Labor Cost -.001 .224** .396***
(.01) (2.12) (3.89)
Constant -.001 .046*** -.189***
(.06) (3.38) (14.25)
Observations 33,733 32,738 32,281
Notes: This table explains the change in aggregate prices in response to exchange rate shocks. The
dependent variable is the log di erence in aggregate prices, according to three de nition. Under de nition
(), aggregate prices are measured as trade weighted unit prices, where both the set of goods and the
trade shares change from one year to the next. Under de nition ()), the set of goods is kept constant.
Under de nition (), trade shares are kept constant. The explanatory variables are: the log change in the
bilateral exchange rate, the log change in the CPI of the exporting country, the log change in the US GDP,
the log change in the exporting country’s labor cost. , ,a n d means statistically di erent from zero
at 10, 5 and 1% level of signi cance. (absolute values of T-stats in parenthesis).
strong composition e ect in response of exchange rate shocks that are consistent with our theo-
retical model. Aggregate prices respond more to exchange rate shocks when both the set of goods
23exported (32.7%24.6%) and the share of those exports are allowed to change (327%13.9%).
The fact that the exchange rate pass-through is lower when the set of goods is kept constant
is evidence that in response to an appreciation, the composition of goods shifts towards more
expensive/ high unit value goods. In addition, the fact that the exchange rate pass-through is
lower when the trade shares are kept constant is evidence that in response to an appreciation, the
share of expensive/ high unit value goods increases.
We run those same regressions at several other levels of disaggregation and  nd that this
composition e ect is robust. For both lower (2-digit) and higher (4, 5, 6-digit), the ranking
of exchange rate pass-through for each de nition of aggregate prices is the same: the exchange
rate pass-through is higher when both the set of goods and trade shares are  exible than when
either is kept constant. However, we found no signi cant evidence that exchange rate shocks have
a signi cant impact on the probability of exit of individual goods, nor that this probability is
di erent for goods of di erent qualities.
We are aware that this procedure is sensitive to changes in the units of measurement used
for the collection of data. A change in the measurement units will change the ranking of unit
values, and their relative contribution to aggregate price shocks. To test that this does not a ect
our results, we randomly reassign unit values. We assign to each of the 19500 goods a random
number between 0 and 1, divide all the quantities by this number and multiply all the unit prices
by the same number. We run the same regressions on this simulated trade dataset and  nd similar
results compared to the original data.
In this section, we have found empirical support for our theoretical model. First, there is
incomplete pass-through of exchange rate shocks into export prices. Second, the degree of pass-
through varies greatly across di erent goods, and it is typically lower for high quality (high
unit value) goods. Third, we  nd evidence of a strong composition e ect. In response to an
appreciation of an exporting country’s currency, composition of exports shifts towards higher
quality goods.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The contribution of this paper is to explain how — in the presence of complete markets and perfect
competition — cost changes brought about by movements of the real exchange rate are transmitted
internationally and what factors explain the magnitude of pass-through. Our model delivers three
24main predictions. First, there is incomplete pass through of exchange rate shocks into consumer
prices of imported goods. Second, there is more pass through for low quality goods than for high
quality goods. Third, in response to an exchange rate appreciation, the composition of exports
shifts towards high quality goods
We develop a perfectly competitive economy featuring heterogeneity of both good qualities
and consumer valuations. In equilibrium, high valuation customers and high quality  rms are
matched, and the relative scarcity of goods of di erent qualities leads to pricing-to-market, with
prices determined by the local tightness of competition. We analyze how of changes in the relative
cost of production a ect prices. Firms accommodate changes in the relative cost brought about
by a change in the exchange rate by adjusting the quantity of its exports. Since the quantities
supplied decrease when the home currency appreciates, export markets get relatively less crowded
and thus prices measured in foreign currency increase, leading to partial exchange rate pass-
through. Moreover, the range of  rms that are actively exporting changes. In the presence of
 xed costs of market access, some low quality  rms no longer export. While the change in the
intensive margin (volume of exports per  rm) a ects all  rms equally, this change in the extensive
margin a ects low quality  rms relatively more, with two associated consequences. First, fewer
 rms are active in the export sector. Second, low quality goods prices respond more to exchange
rate shocks than high quality goods prices. A further consequence of the change in the set of
exporters is that the average composition of  rms changes, leading to an even larger pass through
when both the set of goods exported and the export shares are allowed to adjust.
We  nd strong empirical evidence in support of our theoretical model. First, there is incom-
plete exchange rate pass-through both at the individual good level and at the aggregate level.
Second, high quality goods typically are less sensitive to exchange rate shocks. And third, we  nd
evidence of a composition e ect that increases the share of high quality goods in response to an
exchange rate appreciation.
25Appendix A: proofs
Proof of proposition 1 (assortative matching)
Proposition 1 (reminded) If an equilibrium exists, consumers’ valuations and goods’ quality
are matched assortatively:
1  2   1   2
where consumer  =1 2 with valuation  i sm a t c h e dw i t hag o o do fq u a l i t y.
Proof. By way of contradiction, assume there is an equilibrium such that,
1  2 and 1 * 2
In such a case, consumer 1 with valuation for quality 1 is willing upgrade quality by exchanging
his good of quality 1 against consumer 2’s good of quality 2 a n di na d d i t i o np a yh e ra sm u c h
as 1 (2   1) units of the A good. Consumer 2 on the other hand is willing to downgrade his
q u a l i t yb ye x c h a n g i n gh i sg o o d2 against good 1 in exchange for at least 2 (2   1) units of
the A good. Note that
1  2 and 2  1   1 (2   1)  2 (2   1)
so that both consumers will agree to exchange their goods and at least one of them will be strictly
better o . This cannot be an equilibrium. Hence, in any equilibrium, it must be that
1  2   1   2
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n2
Proposition 2 (reminded) If an equilibrium exists, the mapping from goods quality to prices




where () is the valuation of the consumer matched with a good of quality , 
() is the price
o fag o o do fq u a l i t y,a n d
0 () is the derivative of this price schedule.
Proof. Suppose that an equilibrium exists. Take any two consumers with valuation 1  2,
w h oa r em a t c h e dr e s p e c t i v e l yw i t hg o o d so fq u a l i t y1 and 2,w i t hp r i c e s
1 and 
2.G i v e nt h o s e
26prices, consumer 1 would strictly prefer to buy 2 instead of 1 if 1 (1   2)  (
1   
2).I nt h e
same way, consumer 2 would strictly prefer to buy 1 instead of 2 if 2 (1   2) * (
1   
2).I f
we are in equilibrium, given prices, consumers must not be willing to change their consumption
bundles. So it must be that,
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   0
= 
0 ()=()
where min is the lowest quality actually consumed in equilibrium, with the left derivative only
for 0 = min, and the right derivative only for 0 = max.
Therefore, prices increase with quality. The price schedule mapping qualities to prices is
continuous and continuously di erentiable. And the derivative of the price schedule is exactly
equal to the valuation for quality, denominated in units of marginal utility of the A good.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3
Proposition 3 (reminded) There exists a (
(·) (·)
 min min) solution to Eqs. (5), (6),
(7) and (8), not necessarily unique.
Let us assume for simplicity that the cost function is quadratic, so that  1 (
)=
,a n dt h a t
 =1 . As pointed out by Rochet and Stole (2002, p. 282, footnote 10), this is not a restrictive
assumption. As they argue, the cost function could be any strictly convex function: "since the
measurement of units of consumers’ [valuations] and product qualities are not intrinsic, they can
be rede ned in such a way that costs are quadratic [...]".
Before turning to the proof of proposition 3, it will be useful to  rst prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1 There exists a unique  solution to,
 
     




























Proof. In the third equation, the function $ is continuously decreasing in .S i n c e 	 1
 is
a decreasing function, in the second equation, the denominator is decreasing in , so that the
function   is increasing in $ (). In the  rst equation, the counter-cumulative function 	 is
27decreasing, 	 1
 is decreasing, so that the denominator is increasing in  .   () is increasing in
, so that in the  rst equation, the denominator is increasing in . Therefore the right hand side
of the  rst equation continuously decreases in ,c r o s s i n gt h e45  line only once.
We can now turn to the proof of the existence of an equilibrium.
Proof. It is straightforward to prove that the zero cuto  pro t condition (5) determines a
unique price 
min. Eq. (6) mechanically de nes the matching function (·). We now prove that
there exists a solution (
(·) min) to Eqs. (7) and (8).







2.   and $ are positive real numbers (de ned below). Let
  be a mapping from  = ' × [ ] into itself (proven below), such that  (
1 1)=( 
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 is de ned in Lemma 1. $ is de ned by $ () as in Lemma 1.  = 
min and   is de ned by   ($)
as in Lemma 1.
•  is a Banach space: the set of continuous functions over a closed interval of the real line,
normed by the sup norm, is a Banach space; the Cartesian product of this space and a
closed interval with the Euclidean norm is a Banach space too. Since Cauchy sequences
converge in both ' with the sup norm, and in [ ] with the absolute value norm, then
Cauchy sequences converge in  with the conjugated norm.
•   maps  into itself, or, if (
1 1)   ,t h e n (
1 1)=( 
2 2)   :
— if 
1   ', then by construction, ¯ 	 1
 and 
 being continuous, 
2 is continuous.
— 	 1
 takes only positive values, so for    [1 max], 
2 ()   
min = .
— 	 1
 takes only positive values, so for    [1 max], 
1 ()   
min. 	 1
 is decreasing and
takes only non negative values, so that 
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 is decreasing, so that 2   .
28— for any    [1 max], 
1 ()   $.M o r e o v e r , 
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$. 	 1
 is decreasing, so that 2    .
— We have therefore proven that if (
1 1)   ,t h e n (
1 1)=( 
2 2)   : 
2   '
(it is a continuous function that from an interval included in [ ] into [$]), and
2   [$].
•   is continuous, or   (0   $0 s.t. if k(
1 1)   (
0
10
1)k $,t h e nk (




(, for any (
1 1) and (
0
10
1) in .T OB ED O N E .
Applying Schauder  xed point theorem, there exists a  xed point (not necessarily unique)
(
min) such that (
min)= ( 
min)
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n4






,t h e nt h e r e
exists a unique equilibrium price schedule, lowest quality exported, and lowest price, de ned as,
 
   
















with  and 0 some constants8.
Proof. An equilibrium is de ned by the following 4 equations,
 
       
       






























where ¯ 	 is the "counter cumulative distribution" of valuations . In our closed form example,
we have the following functional forms,
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29We guess that the equilibrium price schedule is of the following form,

()= + 
with  and   some positive constant to be determined. We have now 5 equations and 6 unknowns
((·)
 (·)
 min min   ). This system is underidenti ed. Generically, there will not be a
solution that satis es our guess. We will therefore need to impose one additional condition on the
size of the  xed entry cost, 
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+  1 iif   . We need the assumption that   , otherwise, there are too
many large  rms ( small), or large  rms are too big ( large), and our integrals would not
converge.
30If this equilibrium price schedule holds for every quality, it holds for the lowest quality min,
so that







This together with the equation de ning the lowest valuation min, we get a solution for the lowest
price and for the lowest valuation,
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Proof of proposition 5 (exchange rate pass through)
Proposition 5 (reminded) There is incomplete pass through of exchange rate shocks into the
price of individual goods. The lower the quality of a good, the higher the pass through.
Proof. Formally, de ne .() as the elasticity of the price 
() of a quality  good with respect





































Since the lowest quality is strictly above 0, we know that for any    min,w eh a v e ,

 + 
*. () * 1
There is incomplete pass through of exchange rate shocks into the prices of individual goods (the
elasticity .() is smaller than 1 for all goods), and the lower the quality of a good, the higher the
pass through (the elasticity .() is increasing with the quality ).
Proof of proposition 6 (aggregate pass through)
Proposition 6 (reminded) The price of the lowest quality exported moves one for one with the
exchange rate. The lowest quality exported increases less than proportionally with the exchange
rate.
Proof. Formally, de ne .min as the elasticity of the lowest quality exported (min) with
respect to the exchange rate, and .min as the elasticity of the lowest price (









From the de nition of the equilibrium price schedule in proposition 4,
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Us imports - C.I.D. at UCDavis:
Unit value is calculated as total value of export, including freight and insurance cost, excluding
duty, divided by quantity. Observations are expressed in log change, year over year. All variable
are winsorized.
Exchange rates - IMF, International Financial Statistics:
Avg. nominal exchange rates, USD per foreign currency. For countries adopting the Euro
are all expressed in USD per 1 Euros also for years before the  xed parity was established, to
insure comparability over time. The conversion has been made at the parity established in 1999 or
2001 (for Greece) (See http://www.ecb.int/bc/intro/html/index.en.html# x). Data come from
International Financial Statistics, IMF). Observations are expressed in log change, year over year.
All variable are winsorized.
Real Unit Labor costs — OECD:
This reports the annual labor income share, calculated for this database as total labor costs
divided by nominal output. The OECD documentation states that: “The term labour income
share [...] relates to compensation of employees adjusted for the self employed and thus essentially
relates to labour income. The division of total labour costs by nominal output is sometimes also
referred to as a real unit labour cost - as it is equivalent to a de ated unit labour cost where the
de ator used is the GDP implicit price de ator for the economic activity (i.e. sector) concerned”.
Observations are expressed in log change, year over year. All variables are winsorized.
Consumer Price Index, All items — OECD:
Observations are expressed in log change, year over year. Variables are winsorized.
US gdp growth — OECD:
Observations are expressed in log change, year over year. Variables are winsorized.
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